Chinese Indonesian

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Click on Wikipedia:Translation/Chinese Indonesian and follow the instructions to make a Translation Request Translation has been requested from material at id:Tionghoa-Indonesia

Chinese Indonesian → Chinese Indonesian ---- (more info)

•  Translation Status: Stage 1 : Request (How-to)
  
•  Comment: comment here
  
•  Requested by: Wikiwiki1950 23:42, 28 November 2006 (UTC)
  
•  Interest of the translation: It is wort translating because it will be a very interesting article for bot Chinese and Indonesian people to look at.
  

Join this translation   ---   Update those informations (instructions)

 

For decades, the use of Chinese characters were banned in Indonesia. But in 2004, even presidential candidates, such as Megawati Sukarnoputri and Hasyim Muzadi, used them in their campaign posters for the presidential election.

The Chinese Indonesian (Mandarin: Yin du ni xi ya Huaren (印度尼西亞華人) Hakka: Thong ngin, Min: Teng lang, Indonesian: Tionghoa Indonesia, or (derisively) China totok) are ethnically Chinese people living in Indonesia, as a result of centuries of overseas Chinese migration.

Chinese Indonesian people are diverse in their origins, timing and circumstances of immigration to Indonesia, and level of ties to China. Many trace their origins to the southern parts of China, such as Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan provinces. Broadly speaking, there were three waves of immigration of ethnic Chinese to Southeast Asia in general and Indonesia in particular. The first wave was spurred by trading activities dating back to the time of Zheng He's voyage in the early 15th century, the second wave around the time of the Opium War, and the third wave around the first half of the 20th century. Chinese Indonesians whose ancestors immigrated in the first and second waves, and have thus become creolised or huan-na (in Hokkien) by marriage and assimilation, are called Keturunan Chinese. The more recent Chinese immigrants and those who are still culturally Chinese are called Orang Tiong Hoa. Although there used to be a sizable number of Chinese Indonesians in the rural areas, the largest populations of Chinese Indonesians today are in the cities of Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Pekan Baru, Semarang, Pontianak, Makassar, Palembang, and Bandung, partially due to anti-Chinese legislation in Indonesia.

[edit] Demographics

The economic activities and wealth of the Chinese community in Indonesia is very diverse; many are farmers and small-scale merchants, and others are businessmen. Most are identified as ethnic Chinese in official documents, but many are not, for a variety of reasons. In many parts of Indonesia, however, they are represented among the wealthier classes out of proportion with their small numbers. According to a survey of corporations listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange, the Chinese Indonesian community was thought to own or operate a large fraction of major Indonesian corporations. This is a result of a long government restriction for Chinese Indonesians from going into academia, public service, and other governmental occupations. However, some believe that this overestimates the influence of Chinese Indonesians on the economy: for example, despite being considered to be under control of Chinese Indonesians in research, the Salim Group is actually controlled by Liem Sioe Liong, two pribumi relatives of then President Suharto, and Ibrahim Risyad, an Acehnese associate of one of Suharto's cousins.

Such simplifications fuel the stereotype that Chinese Indonesian people are extremely wealthy, a common perception in Indonesian society. In part, as a result of this perceived dominance of the economy, the Chinese Indonesian community has frequently been viewed with suspicion by indigenous (Pribumi) Indonesians.

[edit] Origins

Most Chinese Indonesian are descended from ethnic groups originally from the south-eastern part of China. These ethnic groups include:

• Hakka
• Hainan
• Hokkien
• Cantonese
• Hokchia
• Teochew

[edit] Ethnic concentrations

• Hakka - Aceh, North Sumatra, Batam, South Sumatra, Bangka-Belitung, Lampung, Java, West Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, Ambon and Jayapura.
• Hainan - Riau (Pekanbaru and Batam), and Manado.
• Hokkien - North Sumatra, Pekanbaru, Padang, Jambi, South Sumatra, Bengkulu, Java, Bali (especially in Denpasar and Singaraja), Banjarmasin, Kutai, Sumbawa, Manggarai, Kupang, Makassar, Kendari, Central Sulawesi, Manado, and Ambon.
• Cantonese - Jakarta, Makassar and Manado.
• Hokchia - Java (especially in Bandung, Cirebon, and Surabaya), Banjarmasin
• Teochew - North Sumatra, Riau, South Sumatra, and West Kalimantan (especially in Pontianak and Ketapang).

[edit] History

[edit] Pre-colonial era

There is little known about Chinese involvement before the Dutch invaded Indonesia other than a few emissaries, such as Fa Hien (Faxian, 法顯) as a Buddhist monk in the 5th century. Kingdoms of Indonesia and China had some relationships that thrived during the Tang dynasty. Starting from the voyage of Zheng He (郑和) in the 15th century, many Chinese considered Indonesia as an attractive trading partner.

[edit] Colonial era to early 20th century (1500s-1900s)

Race relations between the Chinese Indonesians and native Indonesians have always been problematic. Some commentators trace this to the Dutch era when colonial policy favored ethnic Chinese, and in so doing established their economic dominance over the region. The caste system established by the Dutch also made it disadvantageous for ethnic Chinese—and members of other races—to assimilate into the native population: this would mean being put in the third estate, the lowest one, together with the natives. Ethnic Chinese, on the other hand, together with Arabs and other Foreign Orientals were put in the second estate, just a notch beneath the first estate, a category reserved for Europeans and, ironically, Japanese and Siamese nationals as well.^[1]

Colonial race politics aside, many ethnic Chinese were supporters of colonial rule. Indeed, in the early years of the Netherlands East Indies, ethnic Chinese helped strengthen Dutch domination in the region. Souw Ben Kong, the Kapitan Cina of Banten, for example, organized a large-scale immigration of Chinese under his rule to Batavia in the seventeenth century. This significantly destabilized the Bantenese economy, thus facilitating Dutch conquest of the Sultanate. As a reward, Souw was made the first Kapitein der Chinezen of Batavia. His successors, the Kapiteins and, later, the Majoors der Chinezen of Batavia, were given landed fiefdoms and the hereditary title of Sia by the colonial government. Between them, these aristocratic Peranakan families controlled a great deal of Java's land and wealth. Through the officership system, moreover, they governed the Peranakan and ethnic Chinese population of Batavia. The system was later extended to other centers of Dutch power in Java and parts of the rest of the archipelago.^[2]

In 9 october 1740, Dutch East India Company order killing china peoplein Batavia , the killing by estimate more than 5,000-10,000 victim fell in that three day massacre even a river change the name cause the blood flow in there and become angke river (red river), kali angke in indonesia language. ^{[3] [4]}

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, most of these families underwent rapid westernization. By the early decades of the twentieth century, many of them—especially those domiciled around Batavia—had become more "Dutch" than the Dutch themselves: the Sias were consequently some of the strongest proponents of colonial rule. Their hold over the economy, however, was systematically destroyed by the very government they supported in the 1920s and 1930s. Following Queen Wilhelmina's speech to the Estates General (the Dutch Parliament) in which she insisted that a "moral debt" was owed to the people of the East Indies, the colonial government implemented its so-called "social policy". This was aimed at ending feudalism in Java and breaking up the large estates of the Peranakan aristocracy. At this period, the native aristocracy did not own much land due to their belief that influence on citizens, rather than ownership of land, is the base of their power. The native aristocracy owes their employment to the Dutch in the civil service. The Dutch compulsory acquisition of Peranakan fiefdoms destroyed many of the older landowning families. While some managed to go into business successfully, most former Sias—their title became obsolete by the 1940s—were swamped in economic power by Totok Chinese. This latter group remains, even today, the most powerful economic group in Indonesia.^[5]

The Chinese Indonesians built their first schools in Surabaya in the 1920s—one of the first non-Western schools in Java—and by the 1960s, many Chinese schools had been established in the major cities. The first Chinese newspapers were also printed during this era, and several Chinese political parties were established. These political parties range from those who saw themselves as part of the Indonesian nationalism movement, and those who felt that Chinese Indonesians are still Chinese citizens, a question that was left unresolved for many decades. ^{[citation needed]}

The largest waves of Chinese migration happened during early to middle Dutch colonial era, from about the 16th to the 19th century, to find new opportunities to trade. In those times, they had much closer ties toward the mainland China. This was manifested in a strong desire to return home, and considered Indonesia as yet another temporary settlement.

Starting from the middle 18th century, the Qing Emperor of the time, Qian Long, considered these expatriates as turncoats and thereby a threat to China. Although Emperor Qian Long adopted closed-door policy, there was no evidence that Chinese expatriates were banned. Many of them, however, found Indonesia as an increasingly attractive settlement. The hostile and oppressive Manchurian government of Qing dynasty brought even more migrants from China. This was further magnified with Dutch favor toward Chinese Indonesian, mainly because they were intelligent, diligent, and capable to oversee Dutch plantations.

Lulled by comfortable lives, some of them no longer associated themselves with mainland China. They were called Cina Babas or Peranakans. Cina Babas often intermarry with indigenous Indonesian (pribumis). Some of them identified themselves as Dutchmen, embraced Christianity, and generally enjoyed higher education and social status, and thereby considered themselves as more culturally refined. They were called Qiao Sheng (僑生, literally foreign-borned). Those who still maintained ties toward China, whose main belief was Confucianism, considered Cina Babas and Qiao Shengs unfilial, even more so because Cina Babas and Qiao Shengs typically shunned Chinese tradition. The ones who still maintained "purity" were called Cina Totoks. These three groups of Chinese Indonesians had starkly different nationalistic views. At the time, Qiao Shengs were more inclined toward the Dutch; Cina Totoks were more inclined toward mainland China; and Cina Babas were more toward Indonesia.

[edit] Indonesian War of Independence

During the Indonesian War of Independence, many Chinese Indonesians supported the Independence movement. The BPUPKI—Body for Investigating Preparation Attempts of Indonesia's Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia)—included six ethnic Chinese members who contributed to the drafting of the Indonesian Constitution in 1945.^{[citation needed]} Moreover, the Chinese weekly Sin Po was the first to openly publish the text to the national anthem Indonesia Raya in November 1928.

There was discussion on the formation of all-Chinese Indonesian units in the war for Independence [2], similar to the formation of the all-Japanese American Nisei units in World War II. This suggestion was ultimately rejected, and the ethic Chinese were urged instead to join their local pro-Independence groups. In 1946, the Consul General of the Republic of China, Chiang Chia Tung, expressed in Malang that the ROC supported Indonesia's independence.

[edit] Early 20th century to independence (1900s-1945)

Later waves of migrants still maintained ties to China especially by supporting Chinese nationalistic movements to overthrow Qing dynasty. Although the support was mainly monetary, some Chinese Indonesians were actively involved in the inside politics especially so during the Sun Yat Sen era. Cina Totoks were particularly active. Although communist China was largely unsupported at first, their effort to drive Japan out of China gained the support of many Cina Totoks and even some Qiao Shengs. Thus, the support of mainland China was divided into two camps: Nationalistic (Guomindang) and Communistic (Gong Chan Dang).

At the turn of the 20th century, however, Cina Totoks were increasingly assimilated into Indonesian culture. Younger generations still tried to maintain ties with China, but considered themselves as Indonesians and, therefore, adopted more Indonesian-Chinese nationalistic views.

Although the Dutch gave Chinese Indonesian special status, the Dutch were increasingly oppressive and discriminative against all Chinese Indonesians. So, all three groups Qiao Shengs, Cina Babas, and Cina Totoks were more and more cooperative toward the Indonesian nationalistic movement especially in giving monetary support.

More and more Chinese Indonesians were involved in Indonesian politics. Cina Totoks typically set up political parties which aimed toward an Indonesia-China alliance and established newspapers. Cina Babas and Qiao Shengs typically joined other nationalistic parties and even assisted nationalistic movement parties as Dutch or Japanese officers.

All three groups were the pioneers of the usage of Indonesian language, even eclipsed the pribumis in terms of quantity of publication. They were also among the pioneers of Indonesian newspapers. They published their political thoughts along with contributions from other Indonesian writers in their fledgling publishing companies. They even risked their lives as the Dutch banned nationalistic publications.

Chinese Indonesians were very active in supporting an independence movement during the 1940s, as Japan absolved all but one Chinese Indonesian political party, Huaqiao Zhonghui (华侨中会). Some notable ones were Siauw Giok Tjhan and Liem Koen Hian. Some of them, such as Yap Tjwan Bing, became Japanese officers along with other Indonesians to form the agency that later oversaw the independence effort, BPUPKI. Their effort culminated in assisting the preparation of the declaration of Indonesian independence at 17 August 1945. <--end add-->

[edit] Post-independence and New Order Era

In the 1960s, many government regulations, such as PP 10/1959, restricted the Chinese Indonesians from the rural areas and forced many to relocate to the big cities. Moreover, political pressures in the 1970s and 1980s restricted the role of the Chinese Indonesian in politics, academics, and the military. As a result, they were since then constrained professionally to becoming entrepreneurs and professional managers in trade, manufacturing, and banking. In the 1970s, following the failed alleged Communist coup attempt in 1965, there was a strong sentiment against the Chinese Indonesians who were accused of being Communist collaborators.

Most Chinese Indonesian are not Muslim, further fomenting negative sentiments from the mostly Muslim native Indonesians. This is ironic in light of the fact that some of the earliest Muslim evangelists in Java (who were called the Wali Songo or 'The Nine Ambassadors') were of Chinese ancestry. A historical theory even suggests that the first people who brought Islamic faith to Indonesia were the Chinese traders, especially those who came to Semarang under the leadership of Sam Po Kong or Admiral Zheng He—Zheng He himself was not a Han, but a Muslim from a minority ethnic group in China.

Various government policies banned Chinese language teaching, speaking, and publication. Established schools and colleges run by Chinese-Indonesian foundations were nationalized and their facilities seized without compensation and converted to state or pribumi-run schools such as Universitas Res Publica, which became Universitas Trisakti. A presidential directive forced Chinese Indonesian to abandon their Chinese names and adopt Indonesian names. Anti-Chinese sentiments increased among the pribumi Indonesians and anti-Chinese pogroms were frequent. In identity cards, all Chinese Indonesians were designated as "WNI" (Warga Negara Indonesia = Citizen of Indonesia), a euphemism for "ethnic Chinese" as opposed to just "Indonesian" for the pribumi Indonesians. This made it easy for government officials to extract bribes and side payments, and has been compared to Jews under Hitler being required to wear the Star of David badge on their chests. Ethnic Chinese must hold certificates of having rejected Chinese citizenship, despite being native-born and their family having lived in Indonesia for generations.

These highly discriminatory laws are believed by some as a concerted government effort at cultural genocide. Those Chinese Indonesians who could not stand the discrimination fled. The Totoks returned to mainland China—only to catch themselves trapped in Cultural Revolution—and the Peranakans, to the old masters' country, the Netherlands.

In 1998, preceding the fall of Suharto's 32-year presidency, big riots targeted the Chinese Indonesians, pogrom style. It is verified and confirmed that Chinese homes were looted and burned, and many Chinese people were raped or killed[3]. The events in 1998 were significant because unlike earlier pogroms against Chinese Indonesians, due to the Internet, this incident spread world wide in real-time, and aroused the interest and feelings of the ethnic Chinese in China and other countries, which led to demonstrations against Indonesia in many countries with significant Chinese populations and protests to the government of Indonesia. After the tragedy, a large number of Chinese Indonesians fled to other countries, such as the USA, Australia, Singapore, and the Netherlands. Adding insult to injury, Habibie, the unpopular president after Suharto, ridiculed the fleeing Chinese as being unpatriotic. Ironically, Habibie himself left Indonesia to live in Germany after his performance report (pidato pertanggungjawaban) was rejected by the new, democratically-elected parliament in 1999.

Because of discrimination, most Chinese Indonesians were not politically active and could not lobby for legislation to protect their own interests despite their economical affluence. The situation is different in neighboring Malaysia where the overseas Chinese have been both politically and economically active despite being a minority in a similar environment—better off economically in a Muslim majority country.

Despite laws and sentiments against the Chinese Indonesians, many have succeeded in fields other than business, most notably in the sport of badminton, the most popular competitive sport in Indonesia. Indonesian athletes dominated the sport from the 1960s to the 1990s. Many of the beloved players and coaches are Chinese Indonesians, such as Tan Joe Hok, Rudy Hartono, Christian Hadinata, Tjun Tjun, Johan Wahjudi, Ade Chandra, Liem Swie King, Ivana Lie, Verawaty, Susi Susanti, Alan Budikusuma, Ardy Wiranata, and Heryanto Arbi.

During the 1940–1945 war of independence and through the war to defend the independence from Dutch until 1950, surprisingly few Chinese Indonesians were involved in the liberation army. At that time, the economy plummeted and the taxes went sky high. Even everyday goods, such as soaps and spoons, were very rare as Dutch and Japanese confiscated many of them for their own army. Chinese Indonesian contribution in this era was in the smuggling of these goods. However, smuggling was increasingly difficult as Japan affirmed their foothold in Indonesia. Armed conflicts were inevitable. Nevertheless, Chinese Indonesians risked their lives for it.

After the independence, the Japanese and Dutch were routed. Their companies were vacant or sold at very cheap prices. As Chinese Indonesians were apt at trades, they quickly assimilated these companies. However, many pribumis were dissatisfied with the outcome and sought to curb this effort. They were successful in accusing that Chinese Indonesian were rarely involved in armed conflicts and thereby the fledgling Indonesian government forced Chinese Indonesians to relinquish some of them. This upset many Chinese Indonesians. Some reduced their activities in politics, but some were still active and even served as ministers to the newly established republic.

The pribumis still felt left out and discriminated as the economy was increasingly dominated by Chinese Indonesians. The pribumis decried the government's lackluster effort to provide a level playing field and sought even more aggressive predicaments. This further escalated the tension of the already uneasy relationship between pribumis and Chinese Indonesian. Pribumis always considered Chinese Indonesians as the agents of the colonials. The tendency of Chinese Indonesians flocking together in Pecinan or Chinatowns, segregated from the pribumis, exacerbated it.

They succeeded. In 1959, President Soekarno approved PP 10/1959 that forced Chinese Indonesians to close their businesses in rural areas and relocate into urban areas in the hope of giving a competitive advantage for the pribumis to open their businesses in rural areas as the economy was agriculture driven. This upset many Chinese Indonesians. They felt betrayed that their nationalism and heroism were not reckoned with at all. Moreover, the enforcement was brutal; many of them were slaughtered in the effort.

Many Cina Totoks "returned home" in protest to either mainland China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan, only to find that they were not as welcomed there either. Ironically, they were not regarded as "pure Chinese" regardless of their effort of maintaining a "pure Chinese breed". The unfortunate news of the early migrants was widespread among the ones in Indonesia. They soon found themselves as neither Indonesian nor Chinese and thus were in deep identity crisis. Some decided to move to some other places, like Singapore or Malaysia, but some uneasily decided to stay in Indonesia.

[edit] New Order to Early Reform (1965-2000)

By the time Suharto came to power, Chinese Indonesians were increasingly discriminated against. With the justification of denouncing Chinese communism, Suharto not only closed communist-leaning parties, but also extended his reach toward all Chinese Indonesian parties and all aspects of Chinese Indonesian socio-culture. Soeharto effectively stripped Chinese Indonesians of power, banning them from politics and the military. He championed forced assimilation policy against Chinese Indonesians so that they would forget their ties to China. This policy brought forth many anti Chinese legislations. Soeharto passed and enacted very discriminatory citizenship laws, such as forcing Chinese Indonesians to re-register themselves as Indonesian citizens by renouncing their alleged Chinese citizenship regardless of the validity of the Indonesian citizenship they may already have. He denounced Chinese cultures and banned Chinese characters and literature. Allegedly, Soeharto was also the mastermind of the 1965 slaughter of millions of Chinese Indonesians, purportedly to eradicate the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI).

Group divisions among Cina Babas, Qiao Shengs, and Cina Totoks were blurred because Soeharto treated them alike. They were all forced to change their names to Indonesian sounding ones. This law is considered as one of the most humiliating ones to those in the Chinese community in Indonesia since by doing so, they are forced to lose their family name. Between 1965 and 1975, army and police officers were rampant in abusing Chinese Indonesians, such as openly robbing and raping their families. During this time, police could abuse any people using Chinese language. The only way to survive during this harsh period was by using bribes.

In addition, those who were considered as heroes of Indonesian independence, such as Siauw Giok Tjhan and Liem Koen Hian, were either brutally executed, exiled, or jailed. Those who protested were silently murdered. None of them were bestowed national hero status. It effectively discouraged any Chinese Indonesian of the time to dedicate their lives for Indonesia.

Since Chinese Indonesians were banned from all aspects of life except from the economy and industry, they concentrated their effort in those areas and became remarkably successful. It opened opportunities for government and military officers to levy bribes from Chinese Indonesian businessmen. Bribes and corruption soon became a norm. This widened the gap between them and pribumis. The pribumsi accused Chinese Indonesians with colluding with the government and thereby poisoning the entire political system. On the other hand, Chinese Indonesians felt that they were treated unfairly and the government was much more lenient toward the pribumis.

As more and more discrimination and enmity accumulated, Chinese Indonesians increasingly identified themselves as a separate group and did not like to be referred to as "Indonesians". Although younger generations did not as strictly follow traditions as the older ones did, they still felt they were different from Indonesians.

During this era, younger generations adopted western culture more and more as they perceived it as being more superior. They were more aligned toward western countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom. The westernization became popular as many parents sent their children abroad to western countries.

Jakarta riot of 1998 targeted many Chinese Indonesians. The riot itself drew condemnations from Chinese speaking countries. Soeharto was allegedly the mastermind of this riot, but it misfired. Suffering from lootings and arsons, many Chinese Indonesians fled from Indonesia. Ironically, they found western countries were more accepting than Indonesia, their country of birth. Even after the riot subsided, many of them did not want to return.

Those who decided to stay in Indonesia found relief when Soeharto stepped down as president. The memory of the two genocidal riots associated with him, in 1965 and 1998, was not going to fade. They hoped that the new president would restore their status and end the enmity of centuries long.

Early in the reform era, the government focused on stabilizing the economy and security. Discrimination was still rampant. However, Chinese Indonesians gained courage to express themselves in limited ways, which were otherwise impossible in the Soeharto era for fear of his heavy-handed tactics. Unfortunately, there were still many officers loyal to Soeharto who enforced the discriminatory laws. It was not for the sake of ideology, but rather for their own benefits.

[edit] Recent history, post-Reformasi Era

Soon after Abdurrahman Wahid came into power, he quickly abolished some of the discriminatory laws in efforts to improve race relationships. He encouraged Chinese Indonesian literature and culture. He also designated the Chinese lunar new year as a national holiday.

Chinese Indonesians are now in the era of rediscovery. Many younger generations, who cannot speak Mandarin due to the ban decades earlier, choose to learn Mandarin, as many learning centers open throughout the country. Stores now can openly show Chinese characters. Dragon dances and Lion dances are shown in public in many places without special permits or supervision.

The Chinese culture is starting to be embraced by even the popular media, who widely covers Chinese New Year celebrations and even broadcasts TV shows on Feng Shui and news in chinese language in Indonesia television and radio, like Metro tv and Cakrawala broadscast radio.

A small number of Chinese Indonesians also regained the courage to get involved in politics and created new political parties, from one, (Kwik Kian Gie) was appointed minister in 1999. Chinese Indonesians adopted the term Tionghoa (Zhong Hua, 中华, Central Glory) to identify themselves. The term Cina is deemed derogatory today due to its unfortunate derogatory use in the past. Many Chinese Indonesians believe that they are now one distinct part of Indonesia.

[edit] See also

• Famous Chinese Indonesians
• Anti-Chinese legislation in Indonesia
• Jakarta Riots of May 1998
• Demographics of Indonesia
• Malaysian Chinese
• Peranakan
• Overseas Chinese
• Indonesian-sounding names adopted by Chinese Indonesians

[edit] Note

1. ^ http://www.greenleft.org.au/2000/406/23611
2. ^ http://nanyang.xmu.edu.cn/printpage.asp?ArticleID=1369
3. ^ http://home.iae.nl/users/arcengel/NedIndie/chinezenengels.htm
4. ^ http://www.nationaalarchief.nl/amh/detail.aspx?page=dafb&lang=en&id=1897#tab0
5. ^ http://kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/issue/issue2/article_244_p.html

[edit] References

• Mark Landler, "Indonesia's Ethnic Chinese Feel Their Neighbors' Wrath," New York Times, May 16, 1998
• Ong Hok Ham. "Riwayat Tionghoa Peranakan di Jawa (Story of Chinese Descendant in Java): A Collection of Ong Hok Ham's Articles in Star Weekly 1958-1960". Komunitas Bambu. 2005
• "Correcting the myth about the dominance of ethnic Chinese in Indonesian business," Business World (Philippines), 8 January 1999
• Tim Johnson, "Chinese diaspora: Indonesia," BBC News
• The Myth of Chinese Domination, By George J. Adijondro ([4])
• Indonesia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998 by the U.S. Department of State [5].
• INDONESIA: Five years after May 1998 [6]
• Interview of Jusuf Kalla: Businessmen will be Treated Differently (In Indonesian).
• Protests of some Indonesian Chinese Organizations in the US towards racist remark of VP Kalla.
• Khoon Choy, Lee; A Fragile Nation: The Indonesian Crisis (Chapter 9).
• Khoon Choy, Lee; Indonesia, between myth and reality.
• Christine Susanna Tjhin, Minority participation and democratization, The Jakarta Post - September 3, 2004.
• Christine Susanna Tjhin, More Chinese Indonesians become actively engaged in politics, The Jakarta Post - March 29, 2004.